Throughout the history of philosophy, the concept of self-knowledge has been regarded as crucial in two different respects. First, it is assumed that for a thing to be an agent or epistemic subject requires that it be epistemically acquainted with some of its properties or states in a way that others are not. Second, following a frequent and long-standing view, some sort of self-knowledge is required for wisdom. On this presumption, it is by coming to know oneself better or by understanding oneself in light of some knowledge about human nature that people mature. Departing from this observation, the introduction begins by establishing a preliminary definition of the idea of Socratic self-knowledge and discusses a distinction between four different classes of self-knowledge, before it introduces several issues addressed in the singular chapters of the volume.
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