Scholars and laypersons alike routinely express doubt about the ability of democratic publics to adequately assess risk and to respond rationally when emotionally charged issues like crime are on the political agenda, particularly when race and class biases are invoked. In the United States, which has the highest imprisonment rate in the developed world, many scholars have concluded that there are simply too many opportunities for elected officials to be responsive to public opinion. Democratic accountability, in this view, should be limited because too much democracy encourages impulsive, irr ... More

Scholars and laypersons alike routinely express doubt about the ability of democratic publics to adequately assess risk and to respond rationally when emotionally charged issues like crime are on the political agenda, particularly when race and class biases are invoked. In the United States, which has the highest imprisonment rate in the developed world, many scholars have concluded that there are simply too many opportunities for elected officials to be responsive to public opinion. Democratic accountability, in this view, should be limited because too much democracy encourages impulsive, irrational, and even murderous demands, independent of actual risk. These claims about the panic-prone masses—about the dangers of “mob rule”— are widespread and form the central focus of this book. Are democratic majorities easily drawn to crime as a political issue, even when risk of violence is low? Can they support “rational alternatives” to wholly repressive practices, even when the issue triggers racial biases and stereotypes? Drawing on a comparative analysis of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, this book explores when and with what consequences crime becomes a politically salient issue. Reversing much of the conventional wisdom, the analysis finds that serious violence and public and political attention to it are highly correlated and that the United States has high levels of both crime and punishment, in part, because it suffers from a democratic deficit, rather than a surplus, in the production of fundamental collective goods, including risk of violence.