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Free Will and Classical TheismThe Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology$
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Hugh J. McCann

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780190611200

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190611200.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 05 July 2022

Divine Universal Causality Without Occasionalism (and with Agent-Causation)

Divine Universal Causality Without Occasionalism (and with Agent-Causation)

Chapter:
(p.175) Chapter 10 Divine Universal Causality Without Occasionalism (and with Agent-Causation)
Source:
Free Will and Classical Theism
Author(s):

W. Matthews Grant

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190611200.003.0010

If God brings about all that exists distinct from himself, then any entity a creature brings about is also brought about by God. Many have objected that a single effect’s being brought about by God and by a creature is either metaphysically impossible or violates epistemic norms of parsimony. W. Mathews Grant argues in this essay that both sorts of objections fail to divine causality. He then consider arguments that an agent-causal act cannot be caused (and so cannot be caused by God), showing that these arguments also fail. It has not been shown, then, that God’s universal causality and divine conservation preclude creaturely efficacy or agent-causation.

Keywords:   divine causality, agent-causation, creation, divine conservation

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