Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

Print publication date: 1996

Print ISBN-13: 9780195107630

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195107630.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 January 2021

The Ockhamist Solution

The Ockhamist Solution

(p.66) 3 The Ockhamist Solution
The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

Oxford University Press

Perhaps the most widely discussed solution to the divine foreknowledge dilemma in recent years is the Ockhamist solution. Many variations of it have been proposed, and some are probably not very close to the original ntentions of William of Ockham. This chapter considers a solution which is Ockhamist in spirit as it takes accidental necessity seriously and at least initially identifies it with the necessity of the past. It assumes that God exists in time, and also denies that God's beliefs are accidentally necessary. The general idea behind this solution is that even though God had beliefs (more or less) in the past, and even though the past is (more or less) accidentally necessary, God's beliefs nonetheless escape accidental necessity. This chapter also discusses what is known as Thomistic Ockhamism and proposes a solution to the timeless knowledge dilemma.

Keywords:   William of Ockham, God, divine foreknowledge, dilemma, beliefs, accidental necessity, past, Thomistic Ockhamism, timeless knowledge

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .