Two More Solutions of My Own
Two More Solutions of My Own
This chapter proposes two more solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and argues that they solve both the Accidental Necessity Version of the dilemma and what is termed the Timeless Knowledge Dilemma. It revisits the argument against free will from accidental necessity, which includes the statement “If when I bring about an act I cannot do otherwise, I do not bring it about freely.” It proposes a solution that denies this proposition. It asserts that even if all of a person's acts are accidentally necessary, they can still be done freely in a sense of the “free” that is incompatible with determinism. Harry Frankfurt has introduced a class of examples that can be taken to be counterexamples to the proposition mentioned above. The focus of his discussion is on the relationship between the ability to do otherwise and moral responsibility, but his examples can also be used to illustrate the relationship between the ability to do otherwise and acting freely.
Keywords: dilemma, divine foreknowledge, Accidental Necessity Version, Timeless Knowledge Dilemma, free will, determinism, Harry Frankfurt, accidental necessity
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
