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The Philosophy of PsychiatryA Companion$
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Jennifer Radden

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780195149531

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195149531.001.0001

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Thought Insertion

(p.89) Chapter 6 SELF-ASCRIPTION
The Philosophy of Psychiatry
Jennifer Radden
Oxford University Press

This chapter offers a brief philosophical perspective on thought insertion as a disorder or breakdown in the human capacity for self-ascription of one's own conscious activity. It begins by defining thought insertion. It speculates about how best to link the phenomenology or experience of thought insertion with neuropsychological research. It considers an epistemological or identification puzzle about thought insertion that has bothered philosophers of psychiatry and others, and shows how the puzzle may be resolved.

Keywords:   conscious thoughts, phenomenology, neuropsychological research, misidentification puzzle

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