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A Place for ConsciousnessProbing the Deep Structure of the Natural World$
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Gregg H. Rosenberg

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780195168143

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168143.001.0001

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Physicalist Responses to the Argument against Physicalism

Physicalist Responses to the Argument against Physicalism

(p.31) 3 Physicalist Responses to the Argument against Physicalism
A Place for Consciousness

Gregg Rosenberg

Oxford University Press

The argument against physicalism is an argument against the claim that the physical facts entail the facts about phenomenal consciousness. To be able to explain why orthodox physicalist's approaches are unsatisfying, the author first presents the kinds of responses a physicalist may claim and categorizes them into three: appeals to a posteriori necessity, appeals to holism, and warnings about a greater absurdity. In this chapter, each of these strategies for responding to the anti-physicalist arguments is examined. Subsequently, the author outlines various reasons why he considers these responses inadequate.

Keywords:   physicalism, physical facts, phenomenal consciousness, anti-physicalist

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