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Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal KnowledgeNew Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism$
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Torin Alter and Sven Walter

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195171655

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 24 November 2020

Max Black's Objection to Mind‐Body Identity

Max Black's Objection to Mind‐Body Identity

(p.249) twelve Max Black's Objection to Mind‐Body Identity
Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge

Ned Block

Oxford University Press

This chapter criticizes the property dualism argument. It argues that one version of the argument conflates two different notions of mode of presentation: the “cognitive mode of presentation,” which is defined in terms of its role in determining reference and/or explaining cognitive significance; and the “metaphysical mode of presentation,” which is a property of the referent in virtue of which the cognitive mode of presentation plays its semantic and cognitive roles. It also examines John Perry's (2001) book, which discusses both Max Black's argument and the Knowledge Argument as well as some arguments drawn from Stephen White's (1986) essay on the topic and arguments inspired by unpublished papers by White.

Keywords:   property dualism argument, Knowledge Argument, John Perry, Stephen White, Max Black

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