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Human Rights and Human Well-Being$
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William Talbott

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780195173482

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173482.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 10 May 2021

Clarifications and Responses to Objections

Clarifications and Responses to Objections

(p.326) FOURTEEN Clarifications and Responses to Objections
Human Rights and Human Well-Being

William J. Talbott (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter responds to a variety of objections, including the following: that the account is not really consequentialist; that it gives too much priority to states as the guarantors of human rights; that it makes human rights too contingent; that it is implausible that there is any formula for equity; that the claim of first-person authority is implausible; that it leaves out important values, such as the badness of domination; and that it requires a division in practical reason that is “repugnant to common sense”. The chapter also explains why he depends on his readers to help detect his fudge factors and theoretical inertia.

Keywords:   Elizabeth Anderson, claim of first-person authority, cosmopolitanism, consequentialism, divided reason, domination, fudge factors, indirect consequentialism, moral sensitivity, Thomas Nagel, Philip Pettit, privacy rights, public figures, rights across borders, theoretical inertia, trade-offs, utilitarianism

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