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Human Rights and Human Well-Being$
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William Talbott

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780195173482

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173482.001.0001

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Exceptions to Libertarian Natural Rights

Exceptions to Libertarian Natural Rights

Chapter:
(p.28) TWO Exceptions to Libertarian Natural Rights
Source:
Human Rights and Human Well-Being
Author(s):

William J. Talbott (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173482.003.0002

This chapter shows how libertarianism can be seen to be a moral theory that explains exceptions to earlier moral norms and principles and the chapter shows how various exceptions to libertarian principles, including necessity and unconscionability exceptions, can be seen to lead beyond libertarianism to contractarian theories of morality and justice. The chapteer raises a general problem for contractarian theories and shows how the problem applies to the theories of Rawls and Habermas. This sets the stage for the book’s own meta-level consequentialist explanation of the exceptions in the next chapter.

Keywords:   categorical principles, contractarianism, defeasible principles, Jürgen Habermas, hypothetical consent, libertarianism, natural rights, necessity exception, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, theoretical inertia, unconscionability exception

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