- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring
- 3 The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring
- 4 How Long Is Forever
- 5 Variations on the Game
- 6 Applications
- 7 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 8 Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs
- 9 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 10 Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 11 Applications
- 12 Private Monitoring
- 13 Almost Public Monitoring Games
- 14 Belief‐Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring Games
- 15 Reputations with Short-Lived Players
- 16 Reputations with Long-Lived Players
- 17 Finitely Repeated Games
- 18 Modeling Reputations
- Bibliography
- Symbols
- Index
Finitely Repeated Games
Finitely Repeated Games
- Chapter:
- (p.549) 17 Finitely Repeated Games
- Source:
- Repeated Games and Reputations
- Author(s):
George J. Mailath (Contributor Webpage)
Larry Samuelson (Contributor Webpage)
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter presents examples of finitely repeated perfect-monitoring games of the type in which reputation arguments were first introduced, including the prisoners’ dilemma with a tit-for-tat commitment type and the chain store game. It also presents an example of a reputation result for a finitely repeated game of imperfect monitoring.
Keywords: chain-store game, finitely repeated game, prisoners’ dilemma, reputation, tit-for-tat
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring
- 3 The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring
- 4 How Long Is Forever
- 5 Variations on the Game
- 6 Applications
- 7 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 8 Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs
- 9 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 10 Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 11 Applications
- 12 Private Monitoring
- 13 Almost Public Monitoring Games
- 14 Belief‐Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring Games
- 15 Reputations with Short-Lived Players
- 16 Reputations with Long-Lived Players
- 17 Finitely Repeated Games
- 18 Modeling Reputations
- Bibliography
- Symbols
- Index