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Repeated Games and ReputationsLong-Run Relationships$
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George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195300796

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 28 February 2021

 The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring

 The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring

(p.69) 3 The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring
Repeated Games and Reputations

George J. Mailath (Contributor Webpage)

Larry Samuelson (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter presents and proves the folk theorem for games of perfect monitoring. The chapter first proves the folk theorem for two players with public correlation and pure-action individual rationality. This is then generalized to arbitrary numbers of players, via both a dimensionality assumption on feasible payoffs and the idea of non-equivalent utilities, then to games without public correlation and finally to mixed-action individually rational payoffs.

Keywords:   folk theorem, individually rational payoffs, minmax payoffs, nonequivalent utilities, perfect monitoring, public correlation

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