The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
This chapter provides the basic technical tools for working with games of imperfect public monitoring, with games of perfect monitoring as a special case. It introduces the central notions of a public strategy and perfect public equilibrium (PPE), and shows that PPE has a recursive structure. Readers particularly interested in imperfect public monitoring can move straight from Chapter 2 to this chapter. This chapter develops and illustrates the ideas of decomposability, enforceability, and self-generation, the basic tools for working with games of incomplete information, as well as presenting the bang-bang theorem.
Keywords: bang-bang theorem, decomposability, enforceability, imperfect monitoring, public monitoring, public strategy, perfect public equilibrium, PPE, recursion, self-generation
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