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Repeated Games and ReputationsLong-Run Relationships$
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George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195300796

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 01 March 2021

 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

(p.225) 7 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
Repeated Games and Reputations

George J. Mailath (Contributor Webpage)

Larry Samuelson (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter provides the basic technical tools for working with games of imperfect public monitoring, with games of perfect monitoring as a special case. It introduces the central notions of a public strategy and perfect public equilibrium (PPE), and shows that PPE has a recursive structure. Readers particularly interested in imperfect public monitoring can move straight from Chapter 2 to this chapter. This chapter develops and illustrates the ideas of decomposability, enforceability, and self-generation, the basic tools for working with games of incomplete information, as well as presenting the bang-bang theorem.

Keywords:   bang-bang theorem, decomposability, enforceability, imperfect monitoring, public monitoring, public strategy, perfect public equilibrium, PPE, recursion, self-generation

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