- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring
- 3 The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring
- 4 How Long Is Forever
- 5 Variations on the Game
- 6 Applications
- 7 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 8 Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs
- 9 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 10 Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 11 Applications
- 12 Private Monitoring
- 13 Almost Public Monitoring Games
- 14 Belief‐Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring Games
- 15 Reputations with Short-Lived Players
- 16 Reputations with Long-Lived Players
- 17 Finitely Repeated Games
- 18 Modeling Reputations
- Bibliography
- Symbols
- Index
Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs
Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs
- Chapter:
- (p.273) 8 Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs
- Source:
- Repeated Games and Reputations
- Author(s):
George J. Mailath (Contributor Webpage)
Larry Samuelson (Contributor Webpage)
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter uses the tools developed in Chapter 7 to bound the set of equilibrium payoffs for a repeated game, based on decomposing payoffs on half spaces. These bounds imply a lack of efficiency for games with binding moral hazard. Extensive illustrations are provided, primarily with the prisoners’ dilemma.
Keywords: binding moral hazard, decomposability, efficiency, half space, payoff bounds
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring
- 3 The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring
- 4 How Long Is Forever
- 5 Variations on the Game
- 6 Applications
- 7 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 8 Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs
- 9 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 10 Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- 11 Applications
- 12 Private Monitoring
- 13 Almost Public Monitoring Games
- 14 Belief‐Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring Games
- 15 Reputations with Short-Lived Players
- 16 Reputations with Long-Lived Players
- 17 Finitely Repeated Games
- 18 Modeling Reputations
- Bibliography
- Symbols
- Index
