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How International Law WorksA Rational Choice Theory$
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Andrew Guzman

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780195305562

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305562.001.0001

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(p.71) 3 Reputation
How International Law Works

Andrew T Guzman (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter presents a theory of reputation to complement that discussion in Chapter 2. Here, the way in which reputation is acquired and lost is presented. It is explained that the reputational impact of state actions depends critically on the expectations of other states as well as the non‐reputational payoffs faced by the acting state. In order to understand the role of reputation, then, one must consider both reputational and non‐reputational payoffs. The extent to which reputations are compartmentalized (by issue area, by governing regime, by dyad) also impacts the force of reputational concerns, and the chapter clarifies how alternative categories of reputation can affect outcomes.

Keywords:   reputation, uncertainty, compartmentalized reputation, reputational payoffs, non‐reputational payoffs

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