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The Character of Consciousness$
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David J. Chalmers

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780195311105

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 26 January 2022

The Two-Dimensional Argument against Materialism

The Two-Dimensional Argument against Materialism

(p.141) 6 The Two-Dimensional Argument against Materialism
The Character of Consciousness

David J. Chalmers (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter is mainly devoted to the conceivability argument against materialism, viewed through the lens of the two-dimensional semantic framework. The key issue is whether conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. The key opponent is the type-B materialist, who denies the entailment. Many objections and putative counterexamples to the conceivability-possibility thesis have been mooted: the chapter discusses fifteen or so putative counterexamples, along with ten or so objections of other sorts to the conceivability argument. It also sketches a positive grounding for the sort of modal rationalism that drives the conceivability argument.

Keywords:   conceivability argument, materialism, two-dimensional semantic framework, metaphysical possibility, rationalism

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