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The Character of Consciousness$
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David J. Chalmers

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780195311105

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.001.0001

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The Content of Phenomenal Concepts

The Content of Phenomenal Concepts

Chapter:
(p.251) 8 The Content of Phenomenal Concepts
Source:
The Character of Consciousness
Author(s):

David J. Chalmers (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0008

This chapter develops an account of the distinctive nature of phenomenal concepts, grounded in part in an analysis of the epistemological and conceptual observations that drive the arguments against materialism. It argues that phenomenal concepts behave in a way that is quite unlike most other concepts, involving a very strong sort of direct reference, on which the phenomenal qualities that are the referents of the concepts are also somehow present inside their sense. Here, the two-dimensional framework is again a useful tool in analyzing the phenomenon. The account in this chapter is in principle compatible with materialism; in recent years some materialists have developed closely related accounts, but think the account itself is considered fairly neutral.

Keywords:   phenomenal beliefs, phenomenal concepts, consciousness, direct reference, phenomenal qualities

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