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Ecological RationalityIntelligence in the World$
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Peter M. Todd and Gerd Gigerenzer

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780195315448

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195315448.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 07 December 2021

When Is the Recognition Heuristic an Adaptive Tool?

When Is the Recognition Heuristic an Adaptive Tool?

Chapter:
5 When Is the Recognition Heuristic an Adaptive Tool?
Source:
Ecological Rationality
Author(s):

Thorsten Pachur

Peter M. Todd

Gerd Gigerenzer

Lael J. Schooler

Daniel G. Goldstein

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195315448.003.0035

This chapter reviews research addressing four key aspects of the recognition heuristic: (a) that recognition is often an ecologically valid cue; (b) that people often follow recognition when making inferences; (c) that recognition supersedes further cue knowledge; and (d) that its use can produce the less-is-more effect—the phenomenon that lesser degrees of recognition knowledge can lead to more accurate inferences than greater degrees. The recognition heuristic is contrasted to other related concepts, including availability and fluency. From the existing findings, some boundary conditions for the use of the recognition heuristic are carved out. It is suggested that the recognition heuristic is used adaptively and that, compared to other cues, recognition seems to have a special status in decision making. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how systematic ignorance is exploited in other cognitive mechanisms (e.g., estimation and preference).

Keywords:   recognition, memory, heuristic, ecological rationality, noncompensatory, less-is-more effect

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