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Ordinary Objects$
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Amie L. Thomasson

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195319910

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.001.0001

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 Identity, Persistence, and Modality

 Identity, Persistence, and Modality

(p.54) Three. Identity, Persistence, and Modality
Ordinary Objects

Amie L. Thomasson (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The hybrid theory of reference developed in Chapter 2 has important consequences for our understanding of metaphysical claims about identity, persistence, and modality, which are drawn out in this chapter. Specifically, it leads to the view that the most basic conditions of existence, identity, and persistence for the objects we refer to are discoverable by a kind of conceptual analysis, and the most basic claims about these conditions are analytic. This in turn leads to the conceptualist view that the most basic modal claims are likewise analytic. Conventionalist views are often said (e.g., by Michael Rea and Crawford Elder) to lead to objectual anti-realism, but it is argued that modal conceptualism clearly does not. Moreover, modal conceptualism is independently appealing, since it can help soften epistemic and ontological worries about modality.

Keywords:   conceptualism, conventionalism, existence, conceptual analysis, realism, Michael Rea, Crawford Elder

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