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The Philosophy of Deception$
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Clancy Martin

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780195327939

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327939.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 05 March 2021

On the Supposed Duty of Truthfulness

On the Supposed Duty of Truthfulness

Kant on Lying in Self-Defense

(p.225) 12 On the Supposed Duty of Truthfulness
The Philosophy of Deception

David Sussman

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins by admitting how strongly Kant does seem to denounce lying and, indeed, self-deception. It further elaborates Kant's attacks on lying, including his famous claim that truthfulness is an unconditional duty, and goes on to argue that although the conclusions of Kant's “A Supposed Right to Lie” are “wildly implausible”, they do have substantial motivation within Kant's practical philosophy. For Kant, this chapter argues, defensive lies presuppose a principle at odds with the “quasi-contractual commitments” that are the “necessary preconditions of any social order”.

Keywords:   Kant, defensive lies, lying, truthfulness, social order, self-defense

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