On the Supposed Duty of Truthfulness
On the Supposed Duty of Truthfulness
Kant on Lying in Self-Defense
This chapter begins by admitting how strongly Kant does seem to denounce lying and, indeed, self-deception. It further elaborates Kant's attacks on lying, including his famous claim that truthfulness is an unconditional duty, and goes on to argue that although the conclusions of Kant's “A Supposed Right to Lie” are “wildly implausible”, they do have substantial motivation within Kant's practical philosophy. For Kant, this chapter argues, defensive lies presuppose a principle at odds with the “quasi-contractual commitments” that are the “necessary preconditions of any social order”.
Keywords: Kant, defensive lies, lying, truthfulness, social order, self-defense
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