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The Philosophy of Deception$
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Clancy Martin

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780195327939

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327939.001.0001

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Have I Unmasked Self-Deception or Am I Self-Deceived?

Have I Unmasked Self-Deception or Am I Self-Deceived?

(p.260) 14 Have I Unmasked Self-Deception or Am I Self-Deceived?
The Philosophy of Deception

Alfred R. Mele

Oxford University Press

This chapter separates the problem of self-deception into two component questions: how it happens and what it is. The key to this chapter's account of self-deception is called “deflationary view”. Self-deception, it notes, does not entail “intentionally deceiving oneself; intending to deceive oneself; intending to make it easier for oneself to believe something; concurrently believing each of two explicitly contrary propositions”. The chapter also offers a discussion of the notion of “twisted self-deception”: the phenomenon of the self-deceived person believing something he or she wants to be false.

Keywords:   self-deception, deflationary view, twisted self-deception, intentional deception

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