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The Philosophy of Deception$
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Clancy Martin

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780195327939

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327939.001.0001

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On the “Existential Positivity of Our Ability to Be Deceived”

On the “Existential Positivity of Our Ability to Be Deceived”

Chapter:
(p.67) 4 On the “Existential Positivity of Our Ability to Be Deceived”
Source:
The Philosophy of Deception
Author(s):

Mark A. Wrathall

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327939.003.0005

This chapter offers a phenomenological interpretation and development of Nietzsche's observation that “a perspectival, deceptive character belongs to existence”. It uses Merleau–Ponty and Heidegger to explore what it means to experience perceptual deception and asks to what degree are people themselves responsible for the deceptions that occur in perceptual experience. It holds that “the phenomenology of deception points us to the inherently meaningful structure of the perceptual world”. Through studying how these deceptions occur, people realize how deeply they are mentally and creatively engaged with perceptual phenomena.

Keywords:   Nietzsche, phenomenology, perceptual deception, Merleau–Ponty, Heidegger

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