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The Philosophy of Deception$
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Clancy Martin

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780195327939

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327939.001.0001

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Deception and Trust

Deception and Trust

(p.139) 8 Deception and Trust
The Philosophy of Deception

Alan Strudler

Oxford University Press

This chapter addresses the tough question of what makes lying wrong. Using Bernard Williams's idea that deception is wrong because it involves a breach of trust, or it is a manipulation of the dupe by the deceiver, it offers an analysis rich with thought experiments to argue that not all manipulation in deception involves a breach of trust, and that deception that involves a breach of trust may involve a wrong that is distinguishable from that which occurs in other deception. It argues that deception is often a form of legitimate self-defense, and in those instances should be governed by those norms.

Keywords:   Bernard Williams, lying, manipulation, deception, trust, self-defense

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