Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Descartes on Causation$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Tad M. Schmaltz

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780195327946

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327946.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 25 October 2020

Two Causal Axioms

Two Causal Axioms

(p.49) 2 Two Causal Axioms
Descartes on Causation

Tad M. Schmaltz (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter considers two basic causal axioms in Descartes, namely, the “containment axiom” that the total and efficient cause must contain its effect “formally or eminently,” and the “conservation axiom” that the act of conserving an object in existence does not differ in kind from the act of creating it in the first place. It is shown that Descartes borrowed these axioms from the scholastics, and particularly from Suárez, though he adapted the axioms to fit his radically anti-scholastic ontology. It is also argued both that though these axioms allow for the causal efficacy of created beings, Descartes's endorsement of them does not suffice to indicate whether he is an occasionalist, concurrentist, or mere conservationist.

Keywords:   Descartes, causal axioms, causal containment, conservation, creation, scholasticism, Suárez

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .