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Conscious Will and ResponsibilityA Tribute to Benjamin Libet$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780195381641

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381641.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 17 May 2022

Prospective Codes Fulfilled: A Potential Neural Mechanism of Will

Prospective Codes Fulfilled: A Potential Neural Mechanism of Will

(p.146) Chapter 13 Prospective Codes Fulfilled: A Potential Neural Mechanism of Will
Conscious Will and Responsibility

Wheatley Thalia

E. Looser Christine

Oxford University Press

Converging evidence from neuroscience reveals that our brains do predict the future and do so well, but on a short time scale. Bayesian anticipation of likely events appears to be a general principle of brain function. That is, we use information about the probability of past events to predict future events, allowing for a more efficient use of neural resources. While research has begun to show that many systems in the brain code Bayesian predictions, very little work has examined the experiential consequences of this coding. This chapter proposes that prospective neural facilitation may be fundamental to the phenomenological experience of will.

Keywords:   will, future, prospective neural facilitation, prospection, Bayesian anticipation

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