- Title Pages
- Preface
- Contributors
- Introduction
-
Chapter 1 Do We Have Free Will? -
Chapter 2 Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free Will -
Chapter 3 Libet on Free Will: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness -
Chapter 4 Are Voluntary Movements Initiated Preconsciously? The Relationships between Readiness Potentials, Urges, and Decisions -
Chapter 5 Do We Really Know What We Are Doing? Implications of Reported Time of Decision for Theories of Volition -
Chapter 6 Volition: How Physiology Speaks to the Issue of Responsibility -
Chapter 7 What Are Intentions? -
Chapter 8 Beyond Libet: Long-term Prediction of Free Choices from Neuroimaging Signals -
Chapter 9 Forward Modeling Mediates Motor Awareness -
Chapter 10 Volition and the Function of Consciousness -
Chapter 11 Neuroscience, Free Will, and Responsibility -
Chapter 12 Bending Time to One’s Will -
Chapter 13 Prospective Codes Fulfilled: A Potential Neural Mechanism of Will -
Chapter 14 The Phenomenology of Agency and the Libet Results -
Chapter 15 The Threat of Shrinking Agency and Free Will Disillusionism -
Chapter 16 Libet and the Criminal Law’s Voluntary Act Requirement -
Chapter 17 Criminal and Moral Responsibility and the Libet Experiments -
Chapter 18 Libet’s Challenge(s) to Responsible Agency -
Chapter 19 Lessons from Libet - Author index
- Subject Index
Criminal and Moral Responsibility and the Libet Experiments
Criminal and Moral Responsibility and the Libet Experiments
- Chapter:
- (p.204) Chapter 17 Criminal and Moral Responsibility and the Libet Experiments
- Source:
- Conscious Will and Responsibility
- Author(s):
Larry Alexander (Contributor Webpage)
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter analyzes how Libet's experiments bear on criminal and moral responsibility. More specifically, it addresses the question of whether Libet has demonstrated that the consciously willed bodily movement, the centerpiece of our notions of criminal and moral responsibility, is an illusion. It suggests that the gatekeeper role for conscious will, which Libet allows, does not require any revision of traditional notions of moral and criminal responsibility.
Keywords: criminal law, voluntary acts, Benjamin Libet, conscious will, criminal responsibility
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- Title Pages
- Preface
- Contributors
- Introduction
-
Chapter 1 Do We Have Free Will? -
Chapter 2 Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free Will -
Chapter 3 Libet on Free Will: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness -
Chapter 4 Are Voluntary Movements Initiated Preconsciously? The Relationships between Readiness Potentials, Urges, and Decisions -
Chapter 5 Do We Really Know What We Are Doing? Implications of Reported Time of Decision for Theories of Volition -
Chapter 6 Volition: How Physiology Speaks to the Issue of Responsibility -
Chapter 7 What Are Intentions? -
Chapter 8 Beyond Libet: Long-term Prediction of Free Choices from Neuroimaging Signals -
Chapter 9 Forward Modeling Mediates Motor Awareness -
Chapter 10 Volition and the Function of Consciousness -
Chapter 11 Neuroscience, Free Will, and Responsibility -
Chapter 12 Bending Time to One’s Will -
Chapter 13 Prospective Codes Fulfilled: A Potential Neural Mechanism of Will -
Chapter 14 The Phenomenology of Agency and the Libet Results -
Chapter 15 The Threat of Shrinking Agency and Free Will Disillusionism -
Chapter 16 Libet and the Criminal Law’s Voluntary Act Requirement -
Chapter 17 Criminal and Moral Responsibility and the Libet Experiments -
Chapter 18 Libet’s Challenge(s) to Responsible Agency -
Chapter 19 Lessons from Libet - Author index
- Subject Index
