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Conscious Will and ResponsibilityA Tribute to Benjamin Libet$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780195381641

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381641.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 20 May 2022

Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free Will

Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free Will

(p.11) Chapter 2 Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free Will
Conscious Will and Responsibility

Adina L. Roskies

Oxford University Press

This chapter reviews Libet's main claims, and the implications he drew from them about free will and responsibility. It considers first whether, on the supposition that the claims are correct, the empirical interpretations that Libet and many since have gleaned from his data really are warranted. It then addresses whether his empirical claims really have the implications he thinks they have for free will. It is argued that neither Libet's data nor the reasoning that follows strongly support the fairly radical claims about free will that many have supposed.

Keywords:   Benjamin Libet, free will, responsibility, conscious volition, conscious action

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