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Attention Is Cognitive UnisonAn Essay in Philosophical Psychology$
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Christopher Mole

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780195384529

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195384529.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 19 October 2021

Rejecting the Process-First View

Rejecting the Process-First View

Chapter:
(p.35) 3 Rejecting the Process-First View
Source:
Attention Is Cognitive Unison
Author(s):

Christopher Mole (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195384529.003.0003

This chapter argues that attention is the wrong sort of thing to be explained by identifying its constituent processes. The argument draws on the metaphysical distinction drawn in Chapter 2, on evidence showing that some instances of attention are constituted by processes of ‘feature binding’, and on evidence suggesting that those same binding processes can take place without constituting attention, when they occur in patients suffering from unilateral neglect. If attention were a process-first phenomena then such cases where the facts about which processes are taking place fail to settle the question of whether attention is paid ought not to be possible. The chapter concludes by showing that a process-first view of attention is not required in order to explain interference between different attention-demanding tasks.

Keywords:   feature binding, interference, unilateral neglect

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