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Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy$
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Andrew T. Guzman

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780195387704

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387704.001.0001

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International Antitrust Cooperation and the Preference for Nonbinding Regimes

International Antitrust Cooperation and the Preference for Nonbinding Regimes

(p.319) 16 International Antitrust Cooperation and the Preference for Nonbinding Regimes
Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy

Anu Bradford

Oxford University Press

This chapter focuses on the relative merits of binding and nonbinding international antitrust cooperation. It argues that the primary impediment to international antitrust cooperation is the disagreement over the substance and institutional form of such cooperation. This disagreement has led states to water down the proposed binding international antitrust agreement to the point of severely limiting, if not eliminating, any net benefits. In the end, states have chosen not to spend resources and political capital in negotiating a binding international agreement that fails to generate substantial benefits, preferring to resolve their differences informally on a case-by-case basis.

Keywords:   binding international antitrust cooperation, nonbinding international antitrust cooperation, antitrust agreement, competition

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