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Who Knew?Responsibility Without Awareness$
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George Sher

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780195389197

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 17 May 2021

Out of Control

Out of Control

(p.137) Nine Out of Control
Who Knew?

George Sher (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This concluding chapter addresses the main unresolved questions that are raised by the proposed reconstruction of responsibility's epistemic condition. One such question is whether that reconstruction can be extended to accommodate positive as well as negative cases—that is, cases in which agents unwittingly do what is right or prudent rather than what is wrong or foolish. A second question is how responsibility's epistemic condition, as so construed, fits together with its voluntariness condition. Yet a third question is what the account implies about the relation between responsibility and control. The chapter provides answers to each question, and concludes that the picture of responsibility that emerges is not only internally coherent, but singularly well suited to apply to beings that are at once inhabitants of the natural world and possessed of a subjectivity that sets them apart from it.

Keywords:   responsibility for right acts, voluntariness condition, will, control, subjectivity, origination, Neil Levy

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