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Cavell, Companionship, and Christian Theology$
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Peter Dula

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780195395037

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395037.001.0001

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The Claim of Reason's Apophatic Anthropology

The Claim of Reason's Apophatic Anthropology

(p.116) (p.117) 5 The Claim of Reason's Apophatic Anthropology
Cavell, Companionship, and Christian Theology

Peter Dula

Oxford University Press

Some readers of Wittgenstein think that he provides a conclusive refutation of skepticism. Others, like the pragmatists, think he renders skepticism's questions irrelevant. Cavell takes up these issues in detail in his longest and greatest work, The Claim of Reason. There, he rejects both options and, instead, insists that philosophy must remain open to external world and other mind skepticism as a “standing threat to thought and communication.” This chapter provides a brief summary of some key themes of that complex text. It also asks, “What is it Cavell discovers about skepticism that necessitates the turn to companionship, and what is it about those discoveries that invites theological engagement?”

Keywords:   Cavell, The Claim of Reason, skepticism, other minds, Wittgenstein

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