Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
AdvaitaA Contemporary Critique$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Srinivasa Rao

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780198079811

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198079811.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 January 2022

Logical Possibilities

Logical Possibilities

(p.51) Chapter 3 Logical Possibilities

Srinivasa Rao

Oxford University Press

The very idea of non-duality stands seriously violated in the post-Śānkarite orthodoxy and to correct this severe aberration, an entirely new framework is introduced in this chapter. Based on classical Advaita doctrine that there is an experience dependent on senses and the mind (“experience”) which reveals empirical reality (“reality”), and an experience not so dependent (“Experience”) which reveals the Ultimate Reality (“Reality”), four cognitive possibilities are formulated and then all their logical implications are systematically deduced. One major logical consequence deduced is that the “illusoriness of the world”, a basic idea of traditional Advaita, is not at all allowed as a cognitive possibility duly entailed even by the assumptions made in traditional Advaita. This newly formulated framework of possibilities is adopted in the next chapter specifically to analyze afresh the theory of perceptual illusion in Advaita, with startling results.

Keywords:   cognitive possibilities, non-duality, experience, reality, Ultimate Reality, perceptual illusion

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .