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France and the Nazi MenaceIntelligence and Policy Making 1933-1939$
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Peter Jackson

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198208341

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198208341.001.0001

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(p.247) 8 Munich
France and the Nazi Menace


Oxford University Press

This chapter focuses on the Munich Agreement which has served as a touchstone for historians who argue that French leaders surrendered to drift and indecision before the Second World War. This interpretation of Munich is based on two assumptions: that decision makers did not understand the nature of the threat of the Nazis, and that going to war with either Germany or Czechoslovakia was the right decision to make. However, these assumptions do not stand up to careful analysis. Most were convinced that France could not go into war against Germany in 1938. Central to the Munich policy of France was the picture of the balance of power presented to decision makers by the intelligence services.

Keywords:   Munich Agreement, Second World War, Nazis, Germany, Czechoslovakia, France, balance of power, intelligence services

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