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Action and its Explanation$
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David-Hillel Ruben

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780198235880

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235880.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 05 March 2021

The Causal Theory of Action

The Causal Theory of Action

(p.113) 4 The Causal Theory of Action
Action and its Explanation

Ruben David-Hillel

Oxford University Press

This chapter addresses the causal theory of action. It clarifies the idea of belief and argues that there is no genuine sense of ‘belief’ in which there are sufficient beliefs to meet the requirements of the causal theory of action. It describes some possible responses by the causal theorist and rejects them. Finally, the chapter discusses the category of mental action and claims that the causal theorist cannot provide a convincing reconstructive analysis for an important subset of them.

Keywords:   philosophy of action, causal theory of action, belief, mental action

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