Criteria, Counting, and Recounting
Criteria, Counting, and Recounting
In Chapter 4 the treatment of Cavell's scepticism about the external world separated from his treatment of other minds — a highly artificial strategy motivated by the desire to enhance the surveyability of this complex material. However, it is possible to track the development of Cavell's thought beyond The Claim of Reason without taking very seriously the degree to which he sees these two modes or aspects of scepticism as inextricably woven. This chapter isolates and examines Cavell's reasons for holding this view, and traces out some of the consequences flowing from it. In particular, it considers what would follow if we could legitimately transfer a version of the idea of emphatic projection into our understanding of external-world scepticism. For it is with this speculation that Cavell begins to draw his work in The Claim of Reason to a close.
Keywords: Cavell, scepticism, The Claim of Reason, emphatic projection, external-world scepticism
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