This chapter states that this book offers a general metaphysical picture, a theory of content, and a transcendental argument for a form of moral realism. It argues that according to Hume, to provide a theory of content, we need to move all the way from a very general metaphysical picture to the intricacies of the function of words in contexts of propositional attitudes. The second part of the book argues for a series of constraints on a theory of content. The third part offers the outline of a theory of content which meets the condition imposed in the second part. The concern of this book has been to try to make sure that there is an alternative to the Humean view. It offers explicit definitions and precise formulations of more important proposals.
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