The Core of a Theory
The Core of a Theory
This chapter posits that a truth-conditional account would meet the externalism condition of content. It also accounts content in terms of the attribution of truth. Kripke discussed a dispositionalist account of plus and quus. The chapter also suggests a diagnosis of the impossibility of any natural-scientific reduction of content. This diagnosis can be linked with the suggestion of a truth-conditional theory of content: truth itself is a value. Truth is taken to be a property of conceptual content. The chapter also discusses the idea of concept-possession. Discussions in this chapter include: an outline of the theory; the value of truth; values and reduction; the ‘is-ought’ distinction; and a more precise formulation of the theory.
Keywords: truth-conditional account, externalism, Kripke, quus, reduction, value, conceptual content, concept-possessors, is-ought distinction
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