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The Good and the True$
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Michael Morris

Print publication date: 1992

Print ISBN-13: 9780198239444

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.001.0001

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Philosophical Theories and Metaphysical Schemes

Philosophical Theories and Metaphysical Schemes

(p.11) 1 Philosophical Theories and Metaphysical Schemes
The Good and the True

Michael Morris

Oxford University Press

This chapter aims to provide a philosophical theory of content. ‘Content’ here means conceptual content—the content of propositional attitudes. A conception of what philosophical theories should do presupposes a very general metaphysical science. The fundamental objections to the resulting theories trace back to the adoption of the contentious metaphysics of ‘naturalism’. Conceptualism, Platoism, and No-Theory view are the three fundamental approaches to metaphysical issues. What is needed is the development of a general metaphysical theory to provide the constraints that a philosophical theory of content must meet. A developed form of conceptualism is the best general metaphysical theory. This chapter hopes to provide a philosophical theory (or analysis, or reduction) of any particular subject that should accept this general theory.

Keywords:   philosophy, theory of content, metaphysical science, naturalism, conceptualism, Platoism, No-Theory view

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