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The Good and the True$
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Michael Morris

Print publication date: 1992

Print ISBN-13: 9780198239444

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 22 April 2021

Conceptualism is Kantian

Conceptualism is Kantian

(p.21) 2 Conceptualism is Kantian
The Good and the True

Michael Morris

Oxford University Press

This chapter suggests that ‘interest’ in conceptualism's tenet is naturally read in line with something like Kant's conception of a scientific metaphysics. It is the one which may issue from and be testable by a scientific general metaphysical theory. Scientific general metaphysical theory incorporates an operable condition of adequacy for metaphysical explanations which enables us to test some metaphysical explanations effectively, and allows us always to imagine the testing of any significant metaphysical explanation. This chapter also argues that the demand for a scientific metaphysics is incompatible with Platonism; and that familiar objections to Platonism presuppose a commitment to something like a scientific metaphysics. Lastly, this chapter tries to undermine two intuitive arguments of Platonism: two inhabitants have different conceptual schemes and two concept-possessors must think about at least some of the same things.

Keywords:   interesting conceptualism, Kant, scientific metaphysics, Platonism, intuitive arguments

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