Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Good and the True$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michael Morris

Print publication date: 1992

Print ISBN-13: 9780198239444

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 05 December 2020

Informativeness

Informativeness

Chapter:
(p.33) 3 Informativeness
Source:
The Good and the True
Author(s):

Michael Morris

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.003.0004

This chapter posits that if a metaphysical explanation is to be informative, the sentence which provides it must differ in informativeness from the sentence which gave the original description of the same fact. It must be possible for two sentences which differ in informativeness to describe the same facts. The Fregan assumption is the intuitive conception of what is involved in believing that a sentence which one understands is true. The philosophy of conceptual analysis is the position that for metaphysical explanations, new sentences must be intersubstitutable with the old sentences within ascriptions of attitude to any subject. Salmon claims that the function of declarative sentences, both within attitude contexts and outside them, is to ‘encode’ pieces of information which he calls propositions. Propositions are individuated much as facts or states of affairs are.

Keywords:   metaphysical explanation, informativeness, Fregan assumption, conceptual analysis, Salmon, propositions

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .