This chapter defines externalism and argues that it will count unified if there is no division within content. It also cites McGinn's ‘matching problem’. It argues that conceptualism requires externalism. This chapter's definition of externalism specifically included reference to singular thoughts. This chapter also suggests that the idea that content might be divided into an ‘internal’ and an ‘external’ component seems to have originated from Putnam. The fundamental points of the Twin Earth cases, when they are used in connection with the content of beliefs, is to show that the truth conditions of one's thoughts are essential to the identity of those thoughts, or that what one is thinking depends on what one is thinking about.
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