Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Metaphor and Moral Experience$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

A. E. Denham

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198240105

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 January 2021

Converging on Values: Cognition and Sentiment

Converging on Values: Cognition and Sentiment

(p.98) 4 Converging on Values: Cognition and Sentiment
Metaphor and Moral Experience

A. E. Denham

Oxford University Press

This chapter reconsiders the intuitive conception of truth which any account of ‘qualified judgements’ and ‘suitable subjects’ will have to subserve. There are many alternative conceptions of truth; philosophers have characterised it variously in terms of correspondence, coherence, conventional warrant, and idealised assertibility. A minimalist conception of truth is not committed to any constitutive account of the truth-predicate as it applies to any and every discourse, but is rather satisfied to assign minimal content to the idea of ‘truth-in-general’. At least two approaches to this minimalist conception may be distinguished. The first denies that truth is, strictly speaking, a property at all, while the second — known as a ‘minimalist’ approach — allows that any predicate which coincides in normative force with warranted assertibility while yet being potentially divergent from it in extension deserves the title of a truth-predicate.

Keywords:   truth, minimal truth, truth-predicate, moral values, cognition, sentiment, moral judgements, moral discourse, Cognitive Command

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .