Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Metaphor and Moral Experience$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

A. E. Denham

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198240105

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 January 2021

Metaphor and Cognition: Two Theories

Metaphor and Cognition: Two Theories

(p.246) 8 Metaphor and Cognition: Two Theories
Metaphor and Moral Experience

A. E. Denham

Oxford University Press

Modern ‘intuitionist’ theories of metaphor have echoed Plato's views, arguing for a clear distinction between the cognitive function of conventional, literal language and the special symbolic and expressive function of aesthetic language. Intuitionism (as that term is now applied to theories of metaphor) developed in reaction against positivist efforts to reduce the meaningful content of metaphor to its literal paraphrase. On the positivist view, whatever cannot be paraphrased in literal terms is, from the standpoint of meaning, strictly eliminable. In his article ‘What Metaphors Mean’, Donald Davidson argues that metaphorical sentences have no meaning at all (other than their literal sentence meaning). This chapter discusses metaphor and cognition, the analogy between metaphors and jokes, cognitive theories of metaphor, and the interaction theory of metaphor.

Keywords:   metaphor, cognition, jokes, intuitionism, Donald Davidson, interaction theory, cognitive theories, meaning

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .