Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Development of Ethics: Volume 1From Socrates to the Reformation$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Terence Irwin

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780198242673

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242673.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 25 January 2021

Aquinas: Freedom

Aquinas: Freedom

(p.475) 18 Aquinas: Freedom
The Development of Ethics: Volume 1


Oxford University Press

Thomas Aquinas is an implicit compatibilist rather than a soft determinist. He does not affirm causal determinism, and the aspects of his position that commit him to implicit compatibilism do not commit him to implicit determinism. Reasons that he might offer for rejecting determinism do not affect his compatibilism about freedom, if they do not affect his account of the sufficient conditions for freedom. His defence supports his attempted reconciliation of human free will with the Christian doctrines of original sin and divine grace. The chapter's discussion of Aquinas on free will has included considerable repetition of questions discussed earlier, in the account of his views on the will, happiness, the passions, deliberation, and election. This repetition has tried to make clear the main point of his account of free will. Free will raises no further questions besides those already answered in understanding rational agency. On this point, Aquinas develops and applies the reductive strategy attributed to him.

Keywords:   Thomas Aquinas, determinism, compatibilism, freedom, free will, happiness, passions, deliberation, election

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .