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ExperiencesAn Inquiry into Some Ambiguities$
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J. M. Hinton

Print publication date: 1973

Print ISBN-13: 9780198244035

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244035.001.0001

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The common element: general

The common element: general

9 The common element: general

J. M. Hinton

Oxford University Press

This chapter discusses the special, philosophical notion of an experience. It was referred to as involving a form of the following general idea: that a visual experience is ‘inner’ independently of the extent to which it is given meaning by the subject's experience of life. There is truth in this general idea, if only because one's individuality is not a function of experience alone. The relevant philosophical notion, however, is a form of the general idea that the experience had by each of two people would still be ‘inner’; however, many tests or observations, of a kind which might have revealed a difference in the giving of meaning, failed to do so; and not at all because the next test or observation might have revealed such a difference.

Keywords:   experience, subject, truth, individuality, tests, observations

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