Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

C. Thomas Powell

Print publication date: 1990

Print ISBN-13: 9780198244486

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244486.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 25 October 2020

Kant and the Mind-Body Problem: The Fourth Paralogism

Kant and the Mind-Body Problem: The Fourth Paralogism

(p.174) 5 Kant and the Mind-Body Problem: The Fourth Paralogism
Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness

C. Thomas Powell

Oxford University Press

The Fourth Paralogism in A more or less refutes the thesis that nobody can be sure of the existence of the external world. The Fourth Paralogism in B appears to be reduced to a few remarks on what has been termed Immanuel Kant's ignorabimus about the mind-body problem. There is a good deal of philosophical material in this Paralogism that goes beyond that of the Refutation of Idealism and that is directly relevant to Kant's view of the self. This chapter examines two versions of the Fourth Paralogism, beginning with the formal presentation of the syllogism, in order to determine what Kant takes the Fourth Paralogism to be, to suggest likely sources for this Paralogism, and to consider in what way the discussion of the Fourth Paralogism contributes to Kant's attack on rational psychology.

Keywords:   Immanuel Kant, Fourth Paralogism, mind-body problem, self, rational psychology, existence

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .