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Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism$
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D.C. Stove

Print publication date: 1973

Print ISBN-13: 9780198245018

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.001.0001

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Its Further Interpretation and Generalization

Its Further Interpretation and Generalization

(p.53) 4 Its Further Interpretation and Generalization
Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism


Oxford University Press

This chapter reviews the further interpretation and generalization of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. It first introduces the nature of Hume's predictive-inductive scepticism. It also addresses the sceptical content of the statement of logical probability. In addition, Hume's first suppressed premiss as a statement of logical probability is shown. The fallibilist consequence as a statement of logical probability, and the deductivist premiss as a statement of logical probability are covered. The chapter then outlines the generalization of the sceptical conclusion and fallibilist consequence, and the essence of Hume's argument for general inductive scepticism.

Keywords:   David Hume, Hume's argument, inductive scepticism, logical probability, suppressed premisses, fallibilist, deductivist premisses

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