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Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism$
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D.C. Stove

Print publication date: 1973

Print ISBN-13: 9780198245018

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.001.0001

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The Falsity of its Sceptical Conclusion

The Falsity of its Sceptical Conclusion

(p.65) 5 The Falsity of its Sceptical Conclusion
Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism


Oxford University Press

This chapter deals with the falsity of the sceptical conclusion. It is shown that the sceptical conclusion of Hume's argument is false. The currency of Hume's inductive scepticism is first considered. The nature of possible arguments against it is demonstrated. The chapter then addresses von Thun's argument against Hume's inductive scepticism. Von Thun's argument is a proof that inductive scepticism is false. Then, Hume having asserted some statements of logical probability, is not at liberty to reject the principles of logical probability. Consequently, the full ad hominem effect of the von Thun argument is this: that, in the only sense in which statements of logical probability can be inconsistent, it shows that Hume's deductivism, regularity, and inductive fallibilism are inconsistent statements of logical probability.

Keywords:   sceptical conclusion, Hume's argument, falsity, inductive scepticism, von Thun, logical probability, ad hominem, deductivism, inductive fallibilism, regularity

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