Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Keith Lehrer

Print publication date: 1990

Print ISBN-13: 9780198248507

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248507.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 26 September 2020



(p.1) Introduction

Keith Lehrer

Oxford University Press

This book examines freedom, rational acceptance, social consensus, the analysis of knowledge, and Thomas Reid's philosophy of mind. What could possibly unify such a diverse collection of intellectual reflections? An idea about the human mind as a metamind, is the answer. Human freedom, rationality, consensus, knowledge, and conception depend on metamental operations and would not exist without such operations. It is useful to think of the role of the metamental in terms of a simplified computational model of the human mind. The model is a metaphor. The metaphor is a conjecture. The chapters in this book on freedom constitute a defence of compatibilism, that is, the thesis that human freedom is compatible with the claim that everything that occurs is caused or that there are antecedent sufficient conditions for everything that occurs, including human thought and action.

Keywords:   freedom, social consensus, knowledge, Thomas Reid, metamind, rational acceptance, metamental operations, philosophy of mind, compatibilism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .