Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Ontology of MindEvents, Processes, and States$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Helen Steward

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250647

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250647.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 11 May 2021

Token Identity Theories

Token Identity Theories

(p.232) 8 Token Identity Theories
The Ontology of Mind

Helen Steward

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that the mistakes embodied in the view of causation called network model — the view according to which states are to be thought of as separate, causally efficacious particulars, each of which acts in concert with other events and states in a causal network — have lent illusory support to the token identity theory, and to other particularist theories of mind. It argues for the strong claim that the token identity theory is not only untrue of beliefs, desires, and the like, but that without the support provided by the imagery associated with the mistaken causal picture, it is probably unintelligible, conceived of as a theory which encompasses these states. The chapter makes out a case for the correlative thesis that certain conditions on the intelligibility of identity statements which are automatically satisfied where the terms of the identity are genuine particulars go unfulfilled in the case of the token state identities which are of interest to the philosopher of mind — identities between ‘token states’ like beliefs and desires and so-called ‘token states of the brain’ (or of its parts).

Keywords:   network model, token identity, causation, philosophy of mind

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .